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1 Introduction: post-Cold War conflicts and the media 
The fall of the Berlin Wall brought to an end a well-established way of looking at the 
world. Throughout the Cold War era, Western governments were generally clear 
about who their enemies were and who they could count on as allies. For the ‘free 
world’, united under American leadership against the ‘evil empire’ in the East, anti-
Communism provided a stable framework for making sense of international conflict 
and cooperation. The first major post-Cold War conflict, the 1991 Gulf War, indicated 
how much had already changed. Saddam Hussein had enjoyed Western support 
against Iran in the 1980s, but was abruptly cast as the ‘new Hitler’ after his invasion 
of Kuwait in August 1990. Neither the erstwhile Soviet enemy nor Arab states raised 
any serious objections to a UN Security Council resolution authorising massive US-
led military action in the Gulf; but whereas American leadership of the Cold War 
alliance was largely taken for granted, the temporary coalition of 1991 was assembled 
only through months of diplomacy as the US persuaded other countries to participate 
in, or to fund, the war. Long-standing relationships between former friends and 
enemies were now open to question; the international order suddenly more fluid and 
uncertain. 
The 1990s and early 2000s were characterised by a high level of activism on 
the part of the major Western powers. More than half of United Nations peacekeeping 
operations mounted since 1948 were set up in the decade after 1989, for example; at 
its peak in 1994 the number of troops deployed on such missions reaching 72,000 
(IISS 1999: 291). The Cold War Nato military alliance first saw action only after the 
fall of Communism, bombing the Bosnian Serbs in 1994 and 1995 and again bombing 
Yugoslavia in 1999. Britain and France undertook unilateral military missions in 
former African colonies, and for the first time since 1945 Germany and Japan sent 
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their troops overseas on active duty. The rationale and justification for this activism, 
however, was necessarily different from the past. 
This book is about how the media have interpreted conflict and international 
intervention in the years after the Cold War. By comparing press coverage of a 
number of different wars and crises, it seeks to establish which have been the 
dominant themes in explaining the post-Cold War international order and to discover 
how far the patterns established prior to the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks have 
subsequently changed. Throughout, the key concern is with the legitimacy of Western 
intervention: the aim is to investigate the extent to which Western military action is 
represented in news reporting as justifiable and necessary. For journalists, charged 
with writing the first draft of history without benefit of hindsight, the work of 
interpretation and analysis must be direct and instantaneous. Yet reporters do not 
work in a vacuum: their writing will be influenced by the stock of ideas circulating in 
the culture in which they are working, particularly those which are taken up by 
powerful sources. Below we first outline a number of key debates which have been 
influential in shaping how the post-Cold War world has been understood, before 
going on to examine the role played by the news media. 
 
Explaining post-Cold War conflicts and interventions 
Although the threat of nuclear war has receded, the post-Cold War world has not been 
peaceful. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), 
there were 57 different major armed conflicts in 45 different locations around the 
globe between 1990—2001. In any one year, there were on average around 27 
ongoing major conflicts (SIPRI 2000: 17; 2001: 66).1 Both the dynamics of these 
conflicts and the Western response to them seemed to call for new explanations, but 
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such explanations have been controversial, not least because how conflicts are 
understood would seem to have a bearing on how governments might react to them. 
As we shall see, much discussion of media coverage of recent crises has centred on 
whether the ‘wrong’ interpretation has sometimes inhibited an effective response. 
 
Culture and anarchy 
One of the most common ideas about post-Cold War conflicts is that the collapse of 
Communism unleashed pent-up tensions. As the 1992 SIPRI Yearbook put it: 
The end of the Cold War…removed various restraints exercised over parties to 
ethnic conflicts during the Cold War….The conflict in Yugoslavia followed 
the end of the Communist regimes in Eastern and Central Europe. It brought to 
light old and unresolved animosities between, in particular, Serbs and Croats. 
The Communist regime had kept these animosities under control through 
repression. 
(SPIRI 1992: 420) 
In this scenario, ‘old animosities’ based on ethnic or national identity had been 
simmering away under the surface only to burst forth once the restraint of Communist 
repression was removed. Two influential variations of this idea were developed by 
Samuel Huntington and Robert Kaplan. 
Huntington argued that the post-Cold War world was riven by a ‘clash of 
civilisations’: the motor of conflict was not political ideology but deep-seated ethnic 
antagonism. Hence, for example, one of the civilisational ‘fault lines’ which, he 
argued, divided the world, ran ‘almost exactly along the line now separating Croatia 
and Slovenia from the rest of Yugoslavia’ (1993: 30). Huntington’s argument was 
clearly an attempt to re-cast the Cold War division: he suggested that ‘the Velvet 
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Curtain of culture has replaced the Iron Curtain of ideology as the most significant 
dividing line in Europe.’ Those on the wrong side, according to Huntington, are 
‘Orthodox and Muslim’ peoples who are ‘much less likely to develop stable 
democratic political systems’ (1993: 30—1). As Diana Johnstone (2000: 155) notes, 
‘an oddity of these “cultural divide” projections is that they find the abyss between 
Eastern and Western Christianity far deeper and more unbridgeable than the 
difference between Christianity and Islam.’ In trying to find a replacement for the 
Soviet threat, Huntington lumped Muslims together with Serbs and Russians, since 
Islamic fundamentalism was already an established propaganda enemy of the West. 
Such quirks began to look even more odd when, in Bosnia and Kosovo, the dividing 
line appeared to be between Orthodox Christianity and Islam, and Nato’s first ever 
military engagements were justified as being in defence of Muslims. The second 
strand of explanation encountered no such problem, since in this perspective ethnicity 
itself was the source of conflict. Kaplan (1994) drew on Huntington’s ‘clash of 
civilisations’ thesis but developed it to describe a collapse of civilisation in ‘places 
where the Western Enlightenment has not penetrated’; places constantly threatened by 
‘cultural and racial war’; places populated by ‘re-primitivized man’, including the 
Balkans and much of Africa. Where Huntington’s argument emphasised competing 
civilisations in attempting to explain the break-up of states such as Yugoslavia, 
Kaplan’s focused on the breakdown of order in ‘failed’ states such as Somalia. 
The implications of these approaches can diverge significantly when applied 
to particular circumstances. Huntington’s thesis suggests that local, Westernised 
‘goodies’ may be found and that the old East—West boundary can be redrawn: for 
example between Croatia and Serbia. Illustrating how this perspective could function 
as a re-working of the Cold War divide, Croatian President Franjo Tudjman argued 
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that ‘The struggle here is the same that has been going on in Eastern Europe for the 
past three years: democracy against communism’; and then in the same breath also 
suggested that Serbs and Croats were ‘not just different peoples but different 
civilisations’ (European, 18 August 1991). Local leaders thus sought to use the idea 
of a cultural divide to their advantage, sometimes exaggerating or inventing linguistic 
and other cultural differences (Rieff 1995: 67—9). Critics have identified similar 
ideas in media coverage. Peter Brock (1993—94: 162—3), for example, notes how, in 
US reporting of Yugoslavia, terms such as ‘Eastern’, ‘Byzantine’ and ‘Orthodox’ 
were often used pejoratively, to contrast Serbs with ‘Westernised’ Croats. 
Kaplan’s approach is less discriminating, tending to see entire regions as 
outside the civilisational fold. In this view, the resurgence of old antagonisms which 
had been held in check by the Cold War leads to a disintegration of order and a 
reversion to a more primitive condition. Military historian John Keegan (1993: xi), for 
example, argued that: 
The horrors of the war in Yugoslavia, as incomprehensible as they are 
revolting to the civilised mind, defy explanation in conventional military 
terms. The pattern of local hatreds they reveal are unfamiliar to anyone but the 
professional anthropologists who take the warfare of tribal and marginal 
peoples as their subject of study….Most intelligent newspaper readers…will 
be struck by the parallels to be drawn with the behaviour of pre-state peoples. 
Here, civilisation excludes everyone in the Balkans, since all are party to pre-modern, 
‘tribal’ conflicts: rather than looking for local ‘goodies and baddies’, all sides are 
tarred with the brush of tribalism in contrast to the modernity of the West. This 
approach also informed media reporting. During the Kosovo war, for example, one 
journalist recalled visiting Yugoslavia in the 1970s, when he had ‘felt there was 
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something intractably wild and backward about the people in these parts.’ Of the 
present, he said: 
Here in the Balkans, although there is a veneer of civilised behaviour, the 
appearance of prosperity and the suggestion of a future, there is truly only 
history. Nothing else matters. Just history, hatred and ruin. 
(Sunday Telegraph, 4 April 1999) 
The invocation of ‘history’, in this perspective, is not really about seeking historical 
explanations. Instead, it works as a coded suggestion that the region is beyond the 
pale of modernity and civilisation. 
It is not difficult to see the appeal of these frameworks. Both offer new ways 
to make sense of the world which involve a comforting sense of Western superiority. 
Although it has been subjected to much criticism, Huntington’s view in particular has 
continued to be influential, attracting renewed interest after 9/11 when the concept of 
a ‘clash of civilisations’ seemed to describe the confrontation between the West and 
Islam. At least as important, however, has been the critique of such ‘ethnic’ 
explanations, and the elaboration of alternative accounts which view conflicts in terms 
of political violence and genocide. 
 
Politics and morality 
A major objection to explanatory frameworks which rest on the idea of ‘ethnicity’ is 
that the concept tends to be used in an essentialist way. In principle, ‘ethnicity’ is 
quite different from the notion of natural difference entailed in the concept of ‘race’. 
As a matter of culture rather than biology, ‘ethnicity’ implies that identity and 
difference are socially constituted and susceptible to change. In use, however, the 
concepts of ‘race’ and ‘ethnicity’ are often confused or used interchangeably, in a way 
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that implicitly understands ‘ethnic’ differences as fixed and innate. As Michael 
Ignatieff (1998: 56) notes, ‘Ethnicity is sometimes described as if it were skin, a fate 
that cannot be changed.’ Instead, he emphasises the ‘plasticity’ of identity. As against 
Huntington’s notion of an ‘eruption of ancient historical rivalries and antagonisms’, 
Ignatieff argues that, in the case of the former Yugoslavia, professed differences of 
religion and culture were inauthentic and shallow, even fraudulent. The conflict may 
have been ‘about’ ethnic identity, but rather than treating ethnicity as a given which 
causes conflict Ignatieff suggests that an exclusivist politics of identity was 
deliberately encouraged and manipulated by local political leaders and the media. 
This is a telling critique of ‘ethnic’ explanations. As noted above, adopting the 
framework of ‘ethnic conflict’ is really a refusal of explanation: the tendency is to 
downplay or ignore historical and political factors, except insofar as these are located 
in the distant past, and to suggest instead that conflict is somehow inevitable and 
incomprehensible. However, the critique is not an innocent one: it is tied to an 
argument about the necessity for the West to adopt a particular policy – that of 
‘ethical’ intervention. Discussing Kaplan’s ideas, Ignatieff (1998: 98) complains that 
portraying the world as anarchic discourages the West from intervening: ‘If we could 
see a pattern in the chaos, or a chance of bringing some order here or there, the 
rationale for intervention and long-term ethical engagement would become plausible 
again.’ Similarly, Mary Kaldor (1999: 147) rejects the ‘essentialist assumptions about 
culture’ shared by Huntington and Kaplan, but this is more than simply an analytical 
point. Her objection to their arguments is that they ‘cannot envisage alternative forms 
of authority at a global level’: Huntington remains wedded to what she sees as an 
outdated model of state-centric governance, while Kaplan’s analysis implies 
helplessness before the rising tide of chaos. In contrast, Kaldor advocates a system of 
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‘cosmopolitan law-enforcement’, whereby the international community would 
intervene to uphold ‘international humanitarian and human rights law’ (1999: 124—
5). 
The discussion of how to explain conflict is also a debate about how the West 
should respond. In David Keen’s words: ‘In so far as the causes of wars…remain 
poorly understood, it may be relatively easy for some analysts…to insist that a proper 
response is an isolationist one’ (1999: 82). Secretary of State Warren Christopher, for 
example, seemed close to Huntington’s views when he argued in February 1993 that: 
The death of President Tito and the end of communist domination of the 
former Yugoslavia raised the lid on the cauldron of ancient hatreds. This is a 
land where at least three religions and a half-dozen ethnic groups have vied 
across the centuries. 
(Quoted in Allen and Seaton 1999: 1) 
Kaplan’s ideas are thought to have influenced US policy directly: his 1993 book, 
Balkan Ghosts, is ‘credited with dissuading the Clinton administration from its initial 
interventionist line in Bosnia’ (Allen 1999: 27). It seems logical that a view of post-
Cold War conflicts as intractable ‘ethnic wars’ could act as an argument for non-
involvement, or as an excuse when attempted interventions fail. Yet not all analysts 
make a connection between ‘ethnic’ explanations and Western isolationism. David 
Callahan (1997: 17), for example, argues that an upsurge of ethnic conflict since the 
end of the Cold War is a reason for greater activism, suggesting that: ‘Responding to 
ethnic conflict must be part of a broader strategy for reinvigorating US 
internationalism.’ And despite having taken the view that conflict in Yugoslavia was 
caused by incomprehensible tribalism Keegan nevertheless declared that Nato action 
in Kosovo was ‘a victory for that New World Order which, proclaimed by George 
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Bush in the aftermath of the Gulf war, has been so derided since’ (quoted in Chomsky 
1999: 120). 
Furthermore, the argument that there is a connection between an inadequate 
explanation and a particular policy-orientation on the part of Western governments 
could be turned around: the preference for intervention and ‘ethical engagement’ 
might be linked to a tendency to explain conflicts in equally simplistic, good-versus-
evil terms. Kaldor (1999: 117—18), for instance, contends that ‘Those who argued 
that [Bosnia] was a civil war were against intervention’, asserting instead that ‘This 
was a war of ethnic cleansing and genocide.’ In this view of the Bosnian war, in 
which an analogy is drawn with the Nazi Holocaust, it is possible to identify clear 
villains and victims who the Western powers can intervene to punish or protect. To 
explain a conflict as the product of ‘ethnic hatred’ implicitly treats all sides as equally 
guilty, but the concern of many commentators has been to suggest that one side is 
more to blame, or even exclusively to blame. This perspective also involves a 
selective and distorted understanding. While Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic 
was routinely condemned as an ultra-nationalist, for example, comparatively little 
attention was given to the political doctrines of Croatia’s President Tudjman or 
Bosnian leader Alija Izetbegovic, both of whom had espoused an exclusivist 
nationalism prior to the conflict. 
Ultimately, there may be less of a distinction than is usually assumed between 
a view of post-Cold War conflicts as a ‘clash of civilizations’ or an expression of 
‘anarchy’, and an approach which instead divides the world between human rights 
abusers and victims. As Ignatieff (2000: 213) observes: 
While the language of the nation is particularistic – dividing human beings 
into us and them – human rights is universal. In theory, it will not lend itself to 
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dividing human beings into higher and lower, superior and inferior, civilized 
and barbarian. Yet something very like a distinction between superior and 
inferior has been at work in the demonization of human rights violators. 
While some analysts explain the superiority of the West in the vocabulary of 
‘ethnicity’ and ‘civilisation’, the alternative framework of moral superiority produces 
similar results. 
 
Ethical intervention and its critics 
President George Bush Snr.’s proclamation of a ‘New World Order’ at the time of the 
1991 Gulf War soon began to look over-optimistic. Yet the assumption persisted that 
the West was now in a stronger position to bring order to a chaotic world. The ending 
of the Cold War was said to have given the UN Security Council a new lease of life, 
since it was no longer hamstrung by the Soviet veto. As Mark Curtis (1998: 174—6) 
has shown, the idea that UN efficacy was blocked by the Soviet veto was a myth. 
Nevertheless, the fact that Western strategy was not now constrained by the need to 
counter the Soviet threat appeared to allow the possibility of a more principled foreign 
policy: no longer would it be necessary to support unsavoury regimes or to overlook 
human rights abuses because of the demands of Cold War realpolitik. Following the 
Gulf War, in April 1991 the US and its allies intervened again in Iraq to set up ‘safe 
havens’ for Kurds and other minorities. This was the first of a series of humanitarian 
interventions which, as the Western military were sent to deliver food to the starving 
in Somalia, to protect aid and keep the peace in Bosnia, and to ‘restore democracy’ in 
Haiti, seemed to confirm the idea that foreign policy was increasingly driven by 
ethical and humanitarian concerns. 
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While mainstream assessments of the end of the Cold War have tended to see 
it as the start of a new era, however, radical critics have instead emphasised 
continuity, suggesting that both the Cold War and the period since have basically been 
‘business as usual’ for the major Western powers. John Pilger, for example, describes 
the post-Cold War era as a ‘New Cold War’, and writes of ‘the unchanging nature of 
the 500-year Western imperial crusade’ (1999: 38, 21). Pilger has also described the 
post-9/11 period as the ‘Colder War’, arguing that ‘The parallels are striking’ between 
the Cold War and the war on terrorism (Daily Mirror, 29 January 2002). Similarly, 
Noam Chomsky (1990) has argued that for the US the Cold War was ‘largely a war 
against the third world, and a mechanism for retaining a degree of influence over its 
industrial rivals and, crucially, a mode of domestic social organisation. And nothing 
has changed in that respect. So the Cold War hasn’t ended.’ The suggestion of 
continuity is a useful corrective to official proclamations of a brave new world order, 
but much radical criticism is open to the objection that it understates what has 
changed since 1989. 
Of course, Great Power interference in weaker states, sometimes rhetorically 
justified in ‘ethical’ terms, is hardly a new phenomenon. Yet the ‘ethical’ 
interventions of the 1990s did represent something different from the Cold War era. 
Under the post-1945 UN system the governing principle in international affairs, at 
least formally, was one of sovereign equality. The principle of non-interference in the 
affairs of sovereign states meant that external intervention was widely understood as 
illegitimate, and when Western powers, chiefly the US, did intervene they tended to 
do so indirectly, through covert action or via proxy forces (Keeble 1997: 15—18). As 
David Chandler (2002) argues, a significant change since 1989 has been the erosion 
of the principles of sovereign equality and non-interference. From the 1991 Kurdish 
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crisis onwards, the argument has been that sovereignty must not be a barrier to 
effective intervention to uphold human rights or humanitarian principles. As former 
UN Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar put it in 1991: 
We are clearly witnessing what is probably an irresistible shift in public 
attitudes toward the belief that the defense of the oppressed in the name of 
morality should prevail over frontiers and legal documents. 
(Quoted in Rieff 1999: 1) 
Over the course of the 1990s, a growing consensus held that, in the words of the 
former French government minister and founder of Medecins sans Frontieres Bernard 
Kouchner: ‘a new morality can be codified in the “right to intervention” against 
abuses of national sovereignty’ (Los Angeles Times, 18 October 1999). 
In some respects, the most vociferous critics of actual policies have been the 
supporters of the ideal of ethical intervention. One frequent criticism is that concern to 
maintain domestic political support makes Western governments timid about sending 
their troops into action (Shawcross 2000: 374; Ignatieff 2000: 213—15). A second, 
related criticism is that this half-hearted commitment, coupled with what advocates of 
intervention view as an outmoded realist concern with stability and state sovereignty 
on the part of Western political leaders, has led to an over-emphasis on traditional 
ideas of neutrality. Rather than intervening to punish abusers and protect victims, 
humanitarian action has been ineffective, it is argued, because Western forces have 
been deployed as neutral peacekeepers or aid-givers. According to Kaldor (1999: 
118), for instance, a position of neutrality is morally indefensible: ‘The failure to 
protect the victims is a kind of tacit intervention on the side of those who are inflicting 
humanitarian or human rights abuses.’ Similarly, Alex de Waal (1997: 189) argues 
that: ‘international military intervention in Somalia and Bosnia was primarily aimed 
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at protecting aid givers, rather than the populace in the area.’ His main target of 
criticism is the international community’s failure to intervene to prevent or halt 
genocide in Rwanda in 1994. The mistake of the ‘humanitarian international’, he 
argues, was ‘to introduce and elevate the principle of neutrality’ (1997: 192), by 
calling for a ceasefire and humanitarian access instead of forceful intervention. 
Where proponents of ethical intervention tend to see self-interest as limiting 
the West’s willingness to intervene consistently, radical critics have dismissed the 
claim that humanitarianism and human rights have become central to Western foreign 
policy as an ideological cover for the pursuit of hidden interests. Uwe-Jens Heuer and 
Gregor Schirmer (1998), for example, denounce ‘human rights imperialism’ on the 
grounds that, in many cases: ‘the altruism of the intervening parties was a mere 
secondary phenomenon to crude self-interested efforts toward the expansion of 
political and military power, spheres of economic influence, and the like.’ Yet it has 
not been easy for critics to make a convincing case about how interventions in, say, 
Somalia or Kosovo have furthered the ‘crude self-interest’ of Western powers. 
Furthermore, the radical critique is not always as sweeping as it first appears. One line 
of argument, for example, contrasts the claims made for cases of ‘ethical’ intervention 
with comparable cases where the West has not intervened or has actively supported or 
colluded in abuses (Chomsky 1999, 2000a, 2000b). Yet, while it is not intended as 
such, this could be taken as an argument for more intervention. Having held up the 
example of East Timor as one of the places where self-interest prevented Western 
states from making good on their proclaimed commitment to human rights, radical 
critics were somewhat wrong-footed when the West did intervene to establish a UN 
protectorate there in 1999. The underlying assumption of most criticism is that a real 
commitment to upholding human rights would be desirable, so the possibility of 
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genuinely ‘ethical’ interventionism is kept open. Despite sharply criticising the role of 
the West in escalating conflict in former Yugoslavia, for example, Pilger (1993) 
argued that further intervention was necessary in the form of tightening sanctions 
against Serbia, extending sanctions to Croatia, arming the Bosnian Muslims, making 
better use of UN troops, and drawing up a new peace treaty. 
Chandler’s critique of the erosion of sovereign equality, in contrast, implies 
that there can be nothing progressive about ethical interventionism, since there is a 
contradiction between the promotion of human rights, and support for democracy and 
self-determination. From the perspective of the international community’s ‘right to 
intervene’, the sovereignty of weaker states becomes conditional on their compliance 
with ‘human rights norms’: if a state is judged to be violating these norms the 
‘international community’ has a responsibility to intervene. ‘Conditional’ sovereignty, 
of course, is by definition not sovereignty, since it is dependent on the approval of a 
higher authority. Similarly, human ‘rights’ are not really rights as traditionally 
understood. As Chandler (2002: 109) notes, for democratic rights theorists, ‘If a right 
could not be protected, or exercised, by its bearers then it could no longer be a right, 
an expression of self-government.’ Human rights, on the other hand, depend not on 
autonomous self-governing subjects, but on external enforcement in support of 
victims who cannot exercise those ‘rights’ on their own behalf. Like ‘conditional 
sovereignty’, human rights are in the gift of the powerful. A view of (non-Western) 
sovereignty as a ‘tyrant’s charter’ and of (non-Western) people as helpless victims 
implies an outlook which is just as elitist as that which sees the non-Western world as 
uncivilised and barbaric. 
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War on Terrorism and the problem of legitimacy 
Advocacy of ‘ethical’ interventionism in the 1990s rested on the assumption that 
‘might’, in the form of military action by the most powerful states, broadly coincided 
with ‘right’ in that force was used to uphold humanitarian and human rights principles 
(Chandler 2004). In the war on terrorism, however, this assumption has looked 
increasingly questionable. Even supporters of American power acknowledge that it is 
‘suffering a crisis of international legitimacy’ (Kagan 2004: 108). Almost 
immediately after taking office in 2000 George W. Bush’s administration was accused 
of adopting an unacceptably unilateralist foreign policy stance, failing to respect 
international agreements on climate change and nuclear missiles, for instance. A 
particularly pertinent example is America’s insistence on exemption from the 
jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC) established on 1 July 2002. 
America’s refusal to acknowledge any higher authority than its own national 
sovereignty threatened to expose the notion of an international community based on 
norms and values as a fiction. The problem came to a head in the run up to the 2003 
invasion of Iraq when the US declared its intention to act regardless of whether it 
gained United Nations approval. 
At first glance, the contrast between the liberal consensus in favour of 
humanitarian intervention and the division and controversy surrounding the invasion 
of Iraq could not be greater. Yet aspects of ‘war on terror’ interventions which have 
attracted criticism were pioneered in the ‘ethical’ 1990s. Richard Falk contrasts the 
‘golden age’ of humanitarian intervention with the post-9/11 era, complaining that: 
the Bush Administration has been doing its best to wreck world order as it had 
been evolving, and…part of the wreckage is the abandonment of legal 
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restraints on the use of international force, the heart and soul of the UN 
Charter.2 
Yet the advocates of ‘human rights intervention’ themselves undermined the UN 
system by putting the moral duty to intervene above the principle of sovereign 
equality. Voicing the complaint of ethical interventionists throughout Falk’s ‘golden 
age’, Ignatieff argues that upholding sovereign equality means ‘defending tyranny and 
terror’ (New York Times, 7 September 2003). This is what led many, including Falk 
himself, to approve the Kosovo bombing as ‘illegal but moral’. Similarly, there were 
many objections to the Bush administration’s willingness to use pre-emptive force, 
yet this idea had been advocated as part of the West’s ‘right to intervene’ for 
humanitarian or human rights reasons. Kouchner, for example, argued after the 
Kosovo conflict that it was ‘necessary to take the further step of using the right to 
intervention as a preventive measure to stop wars before they start and to stop 
murderers before they kill’ (Los Angeles Times, 18 October 1999). 
Many liberal supporters of humanitarianism and human rights, however, 
disliked the Bush administration, and sought to distinguish between the war on 
terrorism and the sort of ‘moral’ intervention they favour. Geoffrey Robertson, for 
example, whose 1999 book Crimes Against Humanity forcefully made the case for 
international intervention against human rights abuses, criticised US treatment of 
detainees from Afghanistan (Independent, 15 January 2002) and argued that the West 
was wrong to go to war with Iraq (Observer, 8 September 2002). Even Robin Cook, a 
key architect of Labour’s ‘ethical foreign policy’ and Britain’s hawkish Foreign 
Secretary during the Kosovo conflict, emerged as the ‘standard-bearer of the Labour 
“doves”’ over Iraq (Mail, 16 August 2002). Despite their attacks on Anglo-American 
policy these critics were not against intervention as such. Cook’s resignation from 
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government in March 2003, for example, was prompted by the decision of the British 
and American governments to abandon their pursuit of a second UN resolution 
authorizing force against Iraq, implying that he would have supported military action 
with such a mandate. Similarly, Robertson advocated using the framework of 
international human rights law in the war on terrorism, advising that instead of using 
self-defence as justification for attacking Afghanistan, ‘A more modern and more 
permissive legal justification for an armed response is provided by the emerging 
human rights rule that requires international action to prevent and to punish “crimes 
against humanity”’ (Independent, 26 September 2001). Self-defence in Afghanistan or 
imperial ambition in Iraq seemed old-fashioned and illegitimate justifications for war, 
out of step with the liberal humanitarian consensus. 
 
The question of how conflicts and threats, and the global responses to them, are 
understood and explained is of some importance, given that the legal and political 
framework of international relations often seems uncertain in the post-Cold War era. 
This uncertainty is particularly marked in the case of humanitarian or human rights 
intervention, where establishing the nature of conflicts and the legitimacy of 
international responses becomes a crucial but fluid process, in which, as the 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty observed, ‘media 
coverage…is a new element in determining military as well as political strategies’ 
(ICISS 2001: 64). The Independent International Commission on Kosovo described 
its proposals for guiding future intervention as ‘situated in a gray zone of ambiguity 
between an extension of international law and a proposal for an international moral 
consensus’, concluding that ‘this gray zone goes beyond strict ideas of legality to 
incorporate more flexible views of legitimacy’ (IICK 2000: 164). Similarly, the ICISS 
 - 18 - 
suggested that a key objective of international actors must be ‘to establish the 
legitimacy of military intervention when necessary’, and highlighted the role of the 
news media in this process (2001: 11, 63–4). Following the 11 September 2001 
attacks, these issues have become more urgent, but the picture remains unclear. Some 
critics have continued to pursue themes which became prominent in discussion of 
post-1989 conflicts, such as imperialism, or the ‘clash of civilisations’ between the 
West and Islam (Mahajan 2002, Ali 2002). Yet it is evident that other themes, of 
international terrorism and weapons proliferation, have assumed new prominence 
while humanitarian and human rights issues have arguably been neglected (Weiss et 
al. 2004) or compromised (Rieff 2002). It is also clear from the public debate 
surrounding the conflict with Iraq in 2003 that the legitimacy of intervention remains 
a crucial and controversial issue. 
 
The role of the media 
The role of the media in war and conflict has long been a topic of interest for 
academic researchers and others, with the most prominent issue being that of 
propaganda. However, propaganda has not been the main focus in studies of post-
Cold War conflicts and interventions – at least as regards the Western media3 – with 
the exception of the 1991 and 2003 Iraq wars and the partial exception of the Kosovo 
conflict. This is partly because in many cases the Western military have either not 
intervened directly or have been engaged in non-warlike operations, and partly 
because intervention has usually been perceived as desirable. Few studies of the post-
1989 period have dealt directly with media content and examined themes and patterns 
of reporting across different conflicts. Where a comparative approach has been taken, 
attention has largely centred on other issues, such as the place of recent conflicts in 
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the history of war correspondence (Carruthers 2000, McLaughlin 2002); the 
relationships between the media and NGOs in humanitarian emergencies (Giradet 
1995, Rotberg and Weiss 1996); or the effects of media coverage on government 
decision-making (Mermin 1999, Robinson 2002). Nevertheless, many of the issues 
examined above concerning how conflicts and interventions should be understood 
have also been raised in debates about the media. 
 
The CNN effect 
The idea developed in the early 1990s that Western foreign policy was being 
influenced by media coverage of international events: the so-called ‘CNN effect’. 
Former US Defense Secretary James Schlesinger, for instance, wrote in 1992 that 
‘policies seem increasingly subject, especially in democracies, to the images 
flickering across the television screen’, pointing to the Kurdish refugee crisis and 
Somalia as examples (quoted in Livingston 1997: 1). The attraction of the idea, 
subsequently elaborated and explored in a number of studies (Gowing 1994, 1996, 
Hudson and Stanier 1997, Neuman 1996, Strobel 1997), had much to do with the fact 
that Western foreign policy seemed difficult to explain in terms of conventional geo-
strategic interests. Since decisions often appeared arbitrary, the notion of powerful but 
fickle media seemed to offer a plausible explanation for the selective attention paid to 
some crises rather than others. For policy-makers the thought that the media were 
driving foreign policy was a disturbing one, implying a loss of elite control. For 
others, however, it seemed much more positive: the media were able, it was argued, to 
facilitate and promote humanitarian action (Giradet 1995, Minear et al. 1996, Rotberg 
and Weiss 1996, Shaw 1996). 
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Academic research into the CNN effect has generally warned against 
overestimating the power and influence of the media: studies have shown that in 
Somalia and other cases news coverage followed interest on the part of political 
leaders rather than leading it (Livingston 1997, Livingston and Eachus 1995, Mermin 
1999). The most sustained and systematic study is Piers Robinson’s The CNN Effect, 
which suggests that there may be some media influence but only under specific 
circumstances: where policy is uncertain and where coverage is both supportive of 
Western policy and sympathetic toward the victims of war. The present study is not 
concerned with the relationship between media reporting and foreign policy, except at 
the level of ideas. There is no attempt to assess the extent of media influence on 
particular decisions: rather, our interest is in the extent to which the ways that 
journalists explain conflicts and interventions follow the official script, and how far 
they help to write it. We have already seen an example of this in the portrayal of 
Saddam as the ‘new Hitler’, mentioned at the beginning of this chapter. As William 
Dorman and Steven Livingston (1994: 70) show, the comparison with Hitler actually 
originated with journalists who used it before Saddam had invaded Kuwait, in 
reference to his bellicose attitude toward Israel. Just before the invasion politicians 
began drawing the same analogy, and afterwards, once President Bush had made the 
comparison, it pervaded media reports as greater numbers of journalists took up and 
elaborated the idea. 
Robinson’s work is of particular interest because, unlike many other 
commentators on the CNN effect, he methodically examines the content of news 
reports, attempting to measure how far coverage adopts either ‘empathy’ or ‘distance’ 
framing in relation to victims, and the extent to which it presents Western policy as 
likely to succeed. This again raises the issue of the relationship between explanations 
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of crisis and prescriptions for action: only the ‘right’ sort of reporting has the potential 
to encourage intervention. Furthermore, the idea of the CNN effect took a dramatic 
twist early on, when American troops withdrew from Somalia after graphic media 
reports of US casualties in October 1993, leading many to conclude that adverse 
coverage of intervention could also have what Livingston (1997: 2) calls an 
‘impediment effect’. Following the decision to pull out of Somalia, the Clinton 
administration issued a presidential directive setting limits and conditions on any 
future military deployments, apparently demonstrating the way that fear of losing 
political support can make leaders reluctant to intervene. The widely publicised 
failure in Somalia is held to have played a large part in America’s decision not to 
intervene in Rwanda the following year (Livingston and Eachus 2000). The Joint 
Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, an international study commissioned 
by the UN, also concluded that ‘inadequate and inaccurate reporting by international 
media’ had ‘contributed to international indifference and inaction’ (JEEAR 1996: 
Study II, section 4.3). For those – including journalists – who wished to promote 
intervention, these developments accentuated the importance of explaining crises in 
such a way as to counter elite reluctance to pursue ethical policies. 
 
Explanation and advocacy 
Whether or not media coverage actually did pressure governments to adopt policies of 
‘humanitarian intervention’ in the 1990s, it is certainly the case that many journalists 
began to understand their role in these terms. In Britain the best-known proponent of 
this approach is the former BBC correspondent Martin Bell, who coined the phrase 
‘the journalism of attachment’ to describe a style of journalism which ‘cares as well 
as knows’, and which ‘will not stand neutrally between good and evil, right and 
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wrong, the victim and the oppressor’. Bell rejected the ‘dispassionate practices of the 
past’, confessing that he was ‘no longer sure what “objective” means’ (Bell 1998: 
16—8). In the US a similar argument, in favour of ‘advocacy journalism’, is perhaps 
most prominently associated with CNN reporter Christiane Amanpour, who famously 
scolded President Clinton on live television in May 1994 for failing to articulate a 
tough policy on Bosnia (Ricchiardi 1996). Notwithstanding Bell’s comments, the 
journalism of attachment does still entail some commitment to ‘objectivity’ in the 
sense of truthful, factually accurate reporting: what is rejected is moral neutrality. So, 
for example, Amanpour maintains that: ‘In certain situations, the classic definition of 
objectivity can mean neutrality, and neutrality can mean you are an accomplice to all 
sorts of evil’ (quoted in Ricchiardi 1996). This moral objection to ‘neutral’ journalism 
means that reporters feel compelled to take sides in the conflicts they cover. As 
Amanpour explains: 
Once you treat all sides the same in a case such as Bosnia, you are drawing a 
moral equivalence between victim and aggressor. And from here it is a short 
step to being neutral. And from there it’s an even shorter step to becoming an 
accessory to all manners of evil. 
(Quoted in Hume 1997: 6) 
This line of reasoning is reminiscent of Kaldor’s argument that non-intervention is 
immoral. Journalists have argued that the neutrality of peacekeeping and traditional 
humanitarianism results at best in helplessness. BBC correspondent Fergal Keane 
(1995: 124, 186), for example, argues that UN troops in Rwanda ‘had a mandate that 
turned them into little more than spectators to the slaughter’, and suggests that the 
refugee camps which developed on Rwanda’s borders in the wake of the mass killings 
of 1994 were a ‘“humanitarian haven” for the killers’. Similarly, Bell sympathises 
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with UN troops in Bosnia, forced into the role of ‘bystanders’, and sardonically 
describes humanitarian aid as ensuring that victims ‘should not be starving when they 
were shot’ (1996: 135, 190). 
From this perspective, failing to report conflicts in the ‘right’ way is 
understood as complicity with ‘evil’. Advocacy journalists have been highly critical 
of their fellow reporters for following the allegedly neutral agenda of Western 
governments. Ed Vulliamy (1999), who reported from Yugoslavia for the Guardian, 
contends that the ‘neutrality’ of the ‘international community’ has been ‘nowhere 
more evident than in the media’. Similarly, the BBC’s Allan Little (2001) describes 
how in the early 1990s he was ‘bewildered’ by what seemed to be the general 
consensus about Bosnia: 
That the Balkan tribes had been killing each other for centuries and that there 
was nothing that could be done. It was nobody’s fault. It was just, somehow, 
the nature of the region. It was a lie that Western governments at that time 
liked. It got the Western world off the hook. When I and others argued that 
you could not blame all sides equally, the moral implications were that the 
world should – as it later did – take sides. We were denounced – derided even 
– by government ministers as laptop bombardiers. 
Reporters have described a similar consensus about Rwanda. According to Keane 
(1995: 6—8): 
The mass of early reporting of the Rwandan killings conveyed the sense that 
the genocide was the result of some innate inter-ethnic loathing that had 
erupted into irrational violence….[S]everal of the world’s leading 
newspapers…bought the line, in the initial stages, that the killings were a 
straightforward ‘tribal war’. 
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Advocacy journalists, in contrast, sought to identify clear human rights villains and 
victims, explaining conflicts in unambiguous moral terms, and to encourage Western 
military intervention by bringing public pressure to bear through media reports. 
Assessing the extent to which news coverage has indeed adopted an ‘ethnic’ or 
‘tribal’ framework will be an important issue for this study. As we saw earlier, there is 
evidence of journalists portraying the break-up of Yugoslavia in terms of ancient 
‘ethnic’ divisions. However, the issue is not clear-cut. Melissa Wall’s comparative 
study of coverage of Bosnia and Rwanda in US news magazines, for example, found 
that, although in both cases the people of the region concerned were depicted as 
‘inferior to the more “advanced” civilizations of the West’ (1997: 422), Rwanda was 
reported in terms of incomprehensible ‘tribal’ violence while the conflict in Bosnia 
was explained in terms of logical, political and historical motivations. A similar study 
of US press coverage by Garth Myers et al. found that events in Bosnia were reported 
in terms of military strategy and tactics much more than Rwanda; and that, though 
both crises were understood in terms of ‘ethnicity’, in the case of Rwanda violence 
was also described as ‘tribal’, while that in Bosnia almost never was (1996: 33). Both 
studies suggest that Rwanda was depicted as more ‘distant’ and different. Yet the 
terms in which these two studies explain the less distant representation of Bosnia – a 
greater emphasis on military strategy, political decisions and history – are the same as 
those which have led other critics to conclude that the reporting of Bosnia was also 
‘distancing’. Alison Preston (1996: 112, 115), for example, notes the existence of 
‘two co-existent narrative templates…in the coverage, based around the motifs of 
either distance or proximity.’ The first was associated with ‘an emphasis on the 
complicated or difficult’, for example in coverage political and diplomatic 
developments; the second accentuated stories of personal suffering. She concludes 
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that ‘the motif of “complication” dominated discourse about Bosnia.’ It would appear 
that a style of reporting which seems ‘distancing’ in one instance may look quite 
different when compared with coverage of another conflict. 
Referring to the journalism of attachment, Preston (1996: 113) notes that ‘The 
wish to highlight emotional proximity is intrinsically bound to a wish to proselytise.’ 
Some reporters ‘deliberately emphasised the emotional in their reports in order to 
signal the extent of their commitment, and their belief that detachment, or distance, 
should not be inserted.’ Critics have charged, however, that in the process of 
encouraging empathy, advocacy journalists have been guilty of over-simplification. 
With regard to Bosnia, for example, Washington Post journalist Mary Battiata said 
that: ‘There was only one story – a war of aggression against a largely defenseless, 
multi-ethnic population. It was very simple.’ Similarly, for Amanpour: ‘sometimes in 
life, there are clear examples of black and white...I think during the three-and-a-half-
year war in Bosnia, there was a clear aggressor and clear victim’ (quoted in Ricchiardi 
1996). Commitment to a ‘simple’, ‘black and white’ view of a conflict may produce 
just as distorted a picture as the mystified notion of ‘ethnic’ or ‘tribal’ warfare. 
 
Controversy and critique after 9/11 
The vocabulary of ‘good versus evil’ which appealed to liberal advocates of ethical 
intervention in the 1990s began to seem crude and dangerous in the context of the war 
on terrorism. President Bush’s declaration of war on ‘evildoers’, his insistence that 
‘either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists’, and his description of Iraq, Iran, 
North Korea and other states as an ‘axis of evil’ struck many commentators as 
simplistic and ill-informed.4 The record numbers of people who marched in London 
and other cities in protest against the proposed invasion of Iraq indicated that political 
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leaders were having difficulty in making a convincing case for war. Yet ironically, it 
was at the moment when scepticism about official claims seemed to be at its greatest 
that most attention was paid to the media’s role in perpetuating falsehoods and 
distortions. 
Media coverage of ‘ethical’ intervention, insofar as it was discussed as 
propaganda at all, could be understood as ‘good’ propaganda (Taylor 2003: 324), or 
as helpful advocacy on behalf of the oppressed (Shaw 1996: 123). Since 9/11, 
however, particularly in relation to Iraq, discussion has returned to the traditional 
critical focus on the media’s propagandistic role in building support for war. The main 
issue was the misleading claims about Iraq’s possession of ‘weapons of mass 
destruction’ (WMD), the ostensible reason for the invasion (Miller 2004, Rampton 
and Stauber 2003, Solomon and Erlich 2003). Yet some analysts have detected a more 
critical tone in media reporting. Comparing coverage with that of the 1991 Gulf War, 
Howard Tumber and Jerry Palmer suggest argue that in 2003 the reporting of the 
build-up to war was more ‘sensitive to different currents of opinion’ and demonstrated 
greater ‘critical distance’ on the part of journalists (2004: 94). Drawing a similar 
comparison, Stephen Reese (2004: 259) also suggests that in 2003 the media were 
‘less apt to follow government policy’. Certainly in the aftermath of the war the media 
played an prominent role in circulating criticism. The claim by BBC reporter Andrew 
Gilligan that the government had manipulated and falsified intelligence about WMD 
led to a high-profile public enquiry, and pictures of US troops abusing prisoners in 
Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq were publicised by all mainstream news organisations. 
This last example suggests that the ‘ethical’ discourse which was so important 
in establishing the moral legitimacy of Western military intervention in the 1990 may 
itself have become a source of controversy since 9/11. Following criticism of the 
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treatment of detainees in Guantanamo Bay and in Iraq, for example, Amnesty 
International Secretary-General Irene Khan suggested that Western governments may 
be ‘losing their moral compass, sacrificing the global values of human rights in a 
blind pursuit of security’ (Amnesty International 2004). As Michael Ignatieff has put 
it: ‘Since the end of the cold war, human rights has become the dominant moral 
vocabulary in foreign affairs. The question after September 11 is whether the era of 
human rights has come and gone.’ The war on terrorism, he suggested, ‘may 
permanently demote human rights in the hierarchy of America’s foreign policy 
priorities’ (New York Times, 5 February 2002). 
 
Understandings of the media’s role in post-Cold War conflicts and interventions range 
from the view that news reporting has the power to shape foreign policy, through to 
the argument that they serve as conduits for official misinformation and spin. In terms 
of media content, some contradictory claims have been made. Some critics have 
suggested there may be new ideological themes emerging in news coverage which are 
conducive to Western intervention; while others, including some journalists, have 
suggested that a key problem has been a tendency to frame conflicts so as to hamper 
effective intervention, even acting as an alibi for non-intervention. From either 
perspective, the ways in which conflicts and interventions are explained are seen to 
have important consequences. 
 
About this book 
This study looks at UK press coverage of six conflicts and the international response 
to them: two instances of ‘humanitarian military intervention’ (Somalia and Kosovo); 
two cases in which the international community was criticised for not intervening 
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(Bosnia and Rwanda); and two post-9/11 interventions (Afghanistan and Iraq). These 
have been chosen because of their political importance, the large amount of media 
coverage they received, and in order to maximise the comparison of similarities and 
differences across conflicts. Since in some instances news coverage of one crisis 
informed and influenced the reporting of others, the case studies are presented 
chronologically. 
While each of the conflicts throws up different issues to be explored in 
different chapters, the key overall questions posed in this book are: 
• How have post-Cold War conflicts been framed? 
How have conflicts been explained? Are there common patterns in news framing 
across different conflicts? Who, in terms of the main sources cited, are the 
originators of news frames? 
• How are international responses to conflicts framed? 
Have international interventions been seen as legitimate? To what extent do 
claims of legitimacy derive from claims about upholding humanitarianism and 
human rights? Are there alternative sources of legitimacy? 
• Has news framing of conflict changed since 11 September 2001? 
Have ‘ethical’ themes been overshadowed by other concerns? Does reporting of 
human rights issues support or undermine the legitimacy of international 
intervention? 
The remainder of this Introduction explains the approach taken in seeking to address 
these questions in the chapters which follow. 
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News frames 
‘Frames’ are the underlying, sometimes only implicit, ideas through which an account 
of the world is organised. As Robert Entman puts it in his well-known explanation of 
the approach, frames ‘diagnose, evaluate, and prescribe’: 
To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more 
salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular 
problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment 
recommendation. 
(Entman 1993: 52, original emphasis) 
Similarly, Shanto Iyengar and Adam Simon note that a key issue in news framing is 
the attribution of responsibility: 
Attributions of responsibility are generally divided into causal and treatment 
dimensions. Causal responsibility focuses on the origin of the issue or 
problem, while treatment responsibility focuses on who or what has the power 
either to alleviate or to forestall alleviation of the issue. 
(Iyengar and Simon 1994: 171). 
For our purposes, the issue is how the causes of conflicts and crises are understood, 
and what the appropriate international response is thought to be. 
Identifying frames involves close textual analysis – Entman suggests that 
frames are ‘manifested by the presence or absence of certain keywords, stock phrases, 
stereotypical images, sources of information, and sentences that provide thematically 
reinforcing clusters of facts or judgements’ (1993: 52) – but it also entails a 
quantitative assessment of the extent and persistence of a given frame. The qualitative 
aspect of framing analysis offers greater subtlety than traditional content analysis, 
although sometimes this advantage can be lost. Commonly, the stages of framing 
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analysis are, firstly, identifying frames through qualitative study of a relatively small 
sample of texts, and then quantifying the occurrence of keywords associated with 
these frames across a larger sample. While this can often produce illuminating results, 
there is also the danger that at the quantitative stage a simple count of keywords can 
lack nuance. As Entman notes, one of the potential advantages of the framing 
approach is that it ‘avoid[s] treating all negative or positive terms or utterances as 
equally salient and influential’ (1993: 57). The problem is compounded when 
keywords or categories are predicted in advance rather than derived from qualitative 
analysis. In the present study, rather than compiling a list of keywords every article 
was examined qualitatively before proceeding to the quantitative stage of analysis. 
While this approach is more time-consuming and laborious, it does afford greater 
validity. 
A further problem with the keywords approach is that it segments texts into 
countable components instead of treating them as coherent wholes. Checking the 
incidence of key terms can be a useful procedure, and is sometimes used in the 
present study to give a quick indication of framing devices. However, a more accurate 
picture seems more likely to come from examining articles in their entirety as far as 
possible. Particularly in the case of news reports of crises and conflicts, which deal 
with often controversial, new and fast-moving events, one would expect there to be 
competing narratives and explanations rather than only one settled perspective. 
Examining the interaction of different frames within and across texts can reveal much 
about why some diagnoses and prescriptions become favoured over others. According 
to Entman (1993: 55), competing frames reflect ‘the play of power and boundaries of 
discourse over an issue’: 
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Framing…plays a major role in the exertion of political power, and the frame 
in a news text is really the imprint of power – it registers the identity of actors 
or interests that competed to dominate the text. 
The case studies in this book investigate the relationship between framing and power 
through comparing dominant frames with official perspectives, such as those offered 
by political leaders, and through examining the sources used by news reports. 
Particular ways of understanding a problem do not, after all, emerge from nowhere: 
they are likely to be influenced by a range of factors, including who has access to the 
media. Each of the case studies assesses the extent to which critique, dissent and non-
mainstream views are represented. 
In order to appreciate the significance of how a particular event was framed, it 
is important to consider the range of other possible interpretations: both those which 
were available at the time and those which have become established since. As Entman 
(1993: 54) comments, ‘the omissions of potential problem definitions, explanations, 
evaluation, and recommendations may be as critical as the inclusions’. In their study 
of the public debate leading up to the 1991 Gulf War, for example, Dorman and 
Livingston observe that while ‘information regarding the historical root causes of the 
crisis’ received only ‘selective attention’, news reports were ‘rich with references to 
an alternative historical context: Adolf Hitler and Nazi Germany’ (1994: 65, 67). 
They see this failure of explanation as limiting the policy debate about the crisis, 
resulting in the ‘elimination of complicating alternative interpretations and policy 
implications’ (1994: 73). We might also note that the repeated use of the comparison 
with Hitler is likely to have been particularly important since, as Entman notes, ‘Texts 
can make bits of information more salient by placement or repetition, or by 
associating them with culturally familiar symbols’ (1993: 53). The range of possible 
 - 32 - 
responses considered in relation to a conflict seems likely to be related in some way to 
which explanations of the problem are foregrounded and which are marginalised, 
although as we have seen with regard to ‘ethnic’ explanations and non-interventionist 
policies, no straightforward relationship should be assumed. 
 
Samples and sources 
In each case study, four daily newspapers are examined: the Guardian, Independent, 
Times and Mail.5 News articles were acquired electronically from the Lexis/Nexis 
online database.6 The main objective was not to compare different newspapers, 
though similarities and contrasts are noted where relevant. Rather, the reason for 
examining four newspapers was to establish how far the themes identified informed 
newspaper coverage as a whole. For each case, the core sample of coverage consists 
of two four-week periods spanning the beginning and end of each 
conflict/intervention. However, since the conflicts considered here were of varying 
length, in many cases this procedure would not have represented a full enough 
sample: while two such four-week periods encompass the whole of the 2003 Iraq war, 
for example, they would only cover a small part of the Bosnian war. The picture is 
further complicated by the fact that in some cases conflicts do not have clear 
beginning and end points: in Bosnia, for example, different sides have different views 
about when the war began; and in Rwanda and other cases highly significant events 
continued to take place after the main crisis had ‘ended’. The same is also true of 
international interventions: in all of the cases examined here there was significant 
international intervention of one sort or another before the crisis periods began, and 
troops, NGOs and other organisations maintained a presence after the main 
intervention had ended. For these reasons, the core samples are supplemented with 
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additional periods of coverage where appropriate. Particular sampling decisions are 
explained further in the case study chapters. 
 
                                                
1 SIPRI defines ‘major armed conflicts’ as those involving at least 1,000 battle-related deaths in at least 
one year since the onset of hostilities. In the 1990—2001 period the lowest number of major conflicts 
(19) occurred in 1997 and the highest (33) in 1991. 
 
2 ‘Humanitarian Intervention: A Forum’, The Nation, 14 July 2003, 
www.thenation.com/doc.mhtml?i=20030714&s=forum. 
 
3 There have, however, been some studies of the propaganda role of the non-Western media, 
particularly in the former Yugoslavia (Thompson 1999, Skopljanac Brunner et al. 2000) and Rwanda 
(Article 19 1996, Kellow and Steeves 1998). 
 
4 Remarks by the President to Employees at the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 25 September 2001, 
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010925-5.html; Address to a Joint Session of Congress 
and the American People, 20 September 2001, www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-
8.html; State of the Union Address, 29 January 2002, 
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html. 
 
5 A more obvious choice for a fourth newspaper might be the Telegraph. However, at the time of 
writing the newspaper had withdrawn its archives prior to 2000 from all electronic databases. The Mail 
was chosen because of its right-of-centre political stance, and in order to allow some comparisons to be 
drawn between the broadsheet press and a mid-market tabloid. 
 
6 Online news databases are not without their problems. Archives can be unreliable and incomplete, 
and discrepancies can arise when different newspapers’ data are recorded differently. One particular 
problem which deserves mention is that whereas the broadsheets usually split ‘in brief’ columns into 
separate stories, the Mail often bundled more than one item into a single ‘article’. In this study, no 
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changes were made to the way that newspapers separated their articles, except for editorials which 
were always counted as single articles. Where data were evidently incomplete the ProQuest database 
was used as an alternative source, though this did not always yield better results. Where the database 
included different versions of the same article the longest was selected. For these reasons, figures for 
total coverage in the case studies should be treated as approximate. A more general problem with 
electronic versions of newspapers is that they do not include layout, photographs or other illustrations. 
It would be desirable to integrate the textual analysis attempted in this study with the type of framing 
approach to news images offered by Griffin (2004), but on this occasion the limitations of a text-only 
analysis were felt to be outweighed by the advantages it affords in terms of handling larger quantities 
of coverage. 
 
